Debates about end of life decisions should accept that public opinion on these matters is still fluidChanges in the past half century in the attitudes of the American public regarding euthanasia and suicide in the case of incurable disease have been dramatic, and they attest to the success of a social movement that has been in part a phenomenon “of the times” . But they are also in part a consequence of a highly visible social movement and vigorous deliberate actions (...) intended to shape public opinion, moving it in a direction favourable to concrete changes in law, public policy, and precepts of the profession of medicine.During much of this period, a bewildering plethora of polls has been conducted, related in one way or another to the question of how the public has viewed the issues about end of life decisions. End of life decisions have an important bioethical component, especially as they raise questions of who makes choices and how those choices can be made in an ethical manner. Does the individual have complete control of his or her own fate? Who can act as surrogate? What role, if any, should physicians play, and what are the interests of the state in such decisions? Anyone who wants to write a justification for, or promote advocacy of, any kind of policy regarding these issues ought to be seriously acquainted with trends in public attitudes. While public opinion cannot be the final arbiter of what is ethically correct, knowledge of it will help us to address the issues in a way that will best benefit the public discourse. Unfortunately, hardly any presentation of the polls related to the subject has attempted to reconcile the …. (shrink)

Autonomous and automatic weapons would be fire and forget: you activate them, and they decide who, when and how to kill; or they kill at a later time a target you’ve selected earlier. Some argue that this sort of killing is always wrong. If killing is to be done, it should be done only under direct human control. (E.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peter Asaro, Christof Heyns.) I argue that there are surprisingly many kinds of situation where this is false and (...) where the use of Automated Weapons Systems would in fact be morally required. These include cases where a) once one has activated a weapon expected then to behave lethally, it would be appropriate to let it continue because this is part of a plan whose goodness one was best positioned to evaluate before activating the weapon; b) one expects better long-term consequences from allowing it to continue; c) allowing it to continue would express a decision you made to be resolute, a decision that could not have advantaged you had it not been true that you would carry through with it; d) the weapon is mechanically not recallable, so that, to not allow it to carry through, you would have had to refrain from activating it in the first place, something you expected would have disastrous consequences; e) you must deputize necessary killings to autonomous machines in order to protect yourself from guilt you shouldn’t have to bear; f) it would be morally better for the burden of responsibility for the killing to be shared among several agents, and the agents deputizing killing to machines can do this, especially where it’s not predictable which machine will be successful; g) a killing would be morally better done with elements of randomness and lack of deliberation, and a (relatively stupid) machine could do this where a person could not; h) the machine would be acting as a Doomsday Device, so that it could not have had its hoped for deterrent effect had you not ensured that you would be unable to recall it if enemy action activated it; i) letting it carry through is a necessary part of its own learning process, and you expect that this learning will have salutary effects later on; j) human intervention in the machine’s operation would disastrously impair its precision, or its speed and efficiency; k) using non-automated methods would require human resources you just don’t have in a task that nevertheless must be done (e.g., using land-mines to protect remote installations); l) the weapon has such horrible and indiscriminate power that it is doubtful whether it could be actually used in ways compatible with International Humanitarian Law and the Laws of War, which require that weapons be used only in ways respecting distinctness, necessity and proportionality, but its threat of use could respect these principles in affording deterrence provided human error cannot lead to their accidental deployment, this requiring that they be controlled by carefully designed autonomous and automatic systems. I then consider objections based on conceptions of human dignity and find that very often dignity too is best served by autonomous machine killing. Examples include saving your village by activating a robot to kill invading enemies who would inflict great indignity on your village, using a suicide robot to save yourself from a less dignified death at enemy hands, using a robotic drone to kill someone otherwise not accessible in order to restore dignity to someone this person killed and to his family, and using a robot to kill someone who needs killing, but the killing of whom by a human executioner would soil the executioner’s dignity. I conclude that what matters in rightful killing isn’t necessarily that it be under the direct control of a human, but that it be under the control of morality; and that could sometimes require use of an autonomous or automated device. (This paper was formerly called "Fire and Forget: A Defense of the Use of Autonomous Weapons in War" on Philpapers; the current title is the title of the published version.). (shrink)

C/D box snoRNAs (SNORDs) are an abundantly expressed class of short, non‐coding RNAs that have been long known to perform 2′‐O‐methylation of rRNAs. However, approximately half of human SNORDs have no predictable rRNA targets, and numerous SNORDs have been associated with diseases that show no defects in rRNAs, among them Prader‐Willi syndrome, Duplication 15q syndrome and cancer. This apparent discrepancy has been addressed by recent studies showing that SNORDs can act to regulate pre‐mRNA alternative splicing, mRNA abundance, activate enzymes, and (...) be processed into shorter ncRNAs resembling miRNAs and piRNAs. Furthermore, recent biochemical studies have shown that a given SNORD can form both methylating and non‐methylating ribonucleoprotein complexes, providing an indication of the likely physical basis for such diverse new functions. Thus, SNORDs are more structurally and functionally diverse than previously thought, and their role in gene expression is under‐appreciated. The action of SNORDs in non‐methylating complexes can be substituted with oligonucleotides, allowing devising therapies for diseases like Prader‐Willi syndrome. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LUBLIN THOMISM 1 THE TEXTS of the philosophers associated with the Catholic University of Lublin, thanks to the tireless work and energy of an editorial board under bhe direction and support of Marie Lescoe, are at last appearing in English.2 'Dhe Lublin school is Thomist in inspiration and avowed adherence. It is Thomist, however, in a manner which makes liberal use of the works of Continental philosophers in the (...) phenomenological and "existentialist" traditions: hence the label, "existential personaiism." 3 A supplementary label of this sort is needed if we are to include within the Lublin school the work of one of its most iIIustrious members, Karol Wojtyia, whose writings employ the phenomenological method, eschew scholastic argument, and acknowledge a chief indebtedness to Max Scheler. Even the more recognizably scholastic Lublin philosophers, such as Mieczylaw Krapiec, O.P., President -Rector of the University, whose I-Man is the first complete book to be translated and printed in English, quote Roman Ingarden generously, speak familiarly about man as Being-towards-death, and discuss religion and culture in terms of intentionality. 1 Mieczylaw A. Krapiec, O.P., I-Man (New Britain: Mariel Press, 1983); (an abridged, student edition of I-11.fon-Mariel Press, 1985-is now available also); Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, (Boston: D. Reidel, 1979); Edmund Morawiec, "L'Objet et La Tache de la Philosophie Chretienne" in J. N. Zycinski, ed., The Human Person and Philosophy in the Contemporary World (Krakow: The Pontifical Faculty of Theology, 1980). 2 It may interest readers to know that a Chinese translation of I-Man is in preparation. The project is coordinated by Dr. Audrey Donnithorne involving the collaboration of Louis Chow and Matthias Lu. s Of. Andrew Woznicki, A Christian Humanism; Karol Wojtyla's Existential Personalism, and Ronald F. Lawler, The Christian Personalism of John Paul II (Fransciscan Herald Press, 1981). 307 308 ROGER DUNCAN Just because of their deep indebtedness to and immersion in Continental philosophy, it is important to begin by stating what the Lublin philosophers are not. They are not, first of all, phenomenologists or existentialists in the strict sense, by which I mean they do not hold the sceptical epistemological premises usually associated with these labels. Existentialists deny the classical doctrine of truth according to which truth is the adaequatio ad rern of the intellect. Instead they maintain that when I look at, say, an egg, and say to myself, " Here I am, one being among others like this egg here ", I am being naive because I have not yet seen that the distinction between myself and the egg arises within t:he phenomenal field and therefore cannot be uncritically assumed in an account of knowing. The subject-object distinction, they say, is not one more distinction between objects, like that between the egg and the chicken it came from; it cannot be understood as an intellectual grasp of one individual substance by another individual substance. For this reason, according to the existentialists, we must not think of knowledge as an overcoming of the isolation of self-consciousness, but rather as the origination of a distinction, a negative act identical with that of selfconsciousness in its self-transcendence. Awareness of the egg is not a grasp of the egg in itself so much as a self-conscious mitosis which incidentally constitutes the egg as object.4 The realist answer, as Chesterton said, is that eggs are eggs. The fact that the distinction between the egg and the chicken appears within consciousness, and that the subject can see a similarity with the distinction btween himself and the egg,.provides no argument for the unreality of either distinction unless you assume from the start that intentional objectification falsifies or fails to reach being " in itself". But this is a decision, not an a.rgument. Of course once you make it all kinds of curious and very deep condusions follow, conclusions which the Lublin Thomists deny. 4 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 174; Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 75. LUBLIN THOMISM 309 Nevertheless, it does not seem advisable to have to... (shrink)

Historical studies suggest that all ideas, including the philosophical, scientific, and religious, are relative to the culture in which they are formulated. After clarifying the concept of relativism, and exploring the epistemological reasons why knowledge is relative, Kaufman argues that these admissions are not fatal to the achievement of valid knowledge in philosophy and theology.--D. D. O.

Книга посвящена выдающемуся русскому философу Николаю Александровичу Бердяеву. Один из ярчайших представителей русского Серебряного века, философ с мировым именем, он до конца своих дней бился над разгадкой "вечных" вопросов человеческого бытия.

Beschouwingen van de hoogleraar voor kennisleer en metafysica aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam over regelpatronen.

The 10th International Conference on Biomedical Ontology (ICBO 2019), was held at the Jacobs School of Medicine and Biomedical Sciences of the University at Buffalo, in Buffalo, NY, USA. It was the 10-year anniversary of the ICBO series, and the return of the conference to Buffalo after the first two ICBO conferences were held in Buffalo in 2009 and 2011. ICBO 2019 was well attended, with 115 registered attendees and additional walk-ins from the local academic community. The program included excellent (...) keynote talks by Barry Smith, “International Standard Ontology,” and Bjoern Peters, “Putting principles into practice: OBO ontologies and applications in immunology,” as well as 23 oral presentations, 26 posters, and one software presentation. There were 53 papers and abstracts submitted for peer-review to ICBO 2019. Each submission was reviewed by three members chosen from the Program Committee. Of these submissions, 43 were accepted for this volume: 19 full papers, 23 poster abstracts, and 1 software demonstration extended abstract. We thank our program committee for their thoughtful reviews. There were also three workshops and four tutorials (listed below) held in conjunction with the main ICBO 2019 meeting. (shrink)

The primary thesis of this little book is that evil results only from the egotistical pursuit of private ends and is, in some measure, ineradicable from human affairs. As a clarification of moral evil this is persuasive. But the author's attempt to explain natural evil along the same lines is more questionable. --D. D. O.

In contrast to many other scholarly continental works, Bochenski's monumental survey waited only five years for its English translation. The translator has made some minor emendations and has appended a few pages concerning Abélard's contribution to logic. A great contribution to the scholarship of this exciting field. -D. D. O.

AT Historia Animalium 561b27, during the course of his account of chick embryology, Aristotle notes : . D'Arcy Thompson translated this passage as follows: About the twentieth day, if you open the egg and touch the chick, it moves inside and chirps, and it is already coming to be covered in down when, after the twentieth day is past, the chick begins to break the shell.

The article deals with the concept of the Russian national type of personality by G. P. Fedotov. The author finds the connection between Fedotov’s views and the theory of moderate social constructivism, according to which the formation of nation by elite can be successful only if it comes in accordance with geographical and historical ‘landscapes‘. Russian type of personality is seen as a unity of two polar characters - ‘the muscovite‘ and ‘the intelligent‘. The author points out that Fedotov considers (...) culture as a main factor in the development of history, which makes the very existence of intelligentsia the most important condition of solving many social problems in Russia. (shrink)

Allen prefaces his book with a quote from Milton's Apology. In it, Milton confesses to a certain education and training in the art of rhetoric, but contrasts it to the genuine eloquence that truth inspires in those speakers who earnestly desire to teach the good things they know to others. It would seem no accident that Allen has chosen the passage; his intention is to tell us the good things he has found in his inquiry into Socrates' trial and condemnation. (...) Accordingly, the book concentrates on Plato's Apology and Crito. (shrink)

Despite a misleading title, a superfluous introduction, and a dubious concluding argument, this book succeeds in demonstrating the unorthodox thesis that a concept of a "history of reason" is "genuine and central" to Kant’s system. The first part demonstrates a decisive and highly problematic shift in Kant’s practical philosophy, where a synthesis of morality and nature, the idea of the highest good, is made the object of duty. In this way the highest good, initially a "rational version of the notion (...) of the next world," becomes Kant’s regulative idea of history, "the kingdom of God on earth," comprising both "inner disposition and external institution". The ability to realize the highest good is a logical condition of the concept of duty and a "psychological condition of the ‘inner act’ of intention". The latter condition, Yovel suggests, explains why Kant identifies the ground of this ability with God. The sole objective significance of Kant’s idea of God, however, is said to reside in duty’s logical condition, viz., "the assertion that the given world is the highest good in potentia, and that human praxis can make it so actually". Though much more needs to be said, Yovel thus makes a strong case that Kant’s concept of God is "only a subjective decor" and "strictly humanistic". (shrink)

The following essay is an attempt at bringing together two conceptions, the one theological and ascetical, the other philos–ophical. This confrontation may be attempted either from the point of view of theology, using revealed premises, or from the point of view of philosophy using the methods of purely rational analysis. It is the latter task I am undertaking here. I do not argue from revealed premises, but I do take account of the mighty phenomenon of the Christian revelation. It is, (...) as I see it, absolutely essential to keep theology and philosophy distinct as methods, but this does not prevent the one from providing useful material and suggestive hypotheses for the other. (shrink)

Background: Knowledge about assent or dissent of children to non-therapeutic research is poor.Objectives: To assess sociodemographic characteristics in healthy children and adolescents who were invited to participate in non-therapeutic research, to evaluate their motives for assent or dissent and their understanding of the information given.Methods: A total of 1281 healthy children and adolescents six to sixteen years of age were invited to participate in a non-therapeutic study and a questionnaire.Results: Assenting children were motivated by a desire to help sick children (...) and to gain experience with participating in a research study . Dissenting children made their decision because of worries about having a blood or a urine sample taken or because of worries about a doctor’s examination . Fewer children in the assent group than in the dissent group worried about the doctor’s examination . In the assent and dissent group, 568 and 343 children, respectively, said they were able to understand some or all of the written information , and 650 and 330 , respectively, were able to understand some or all of the verbal information .Conclusions: Sociodemographic characteristics may not influence healthy children’s decision to volunteer for non-therapeutic research. Assenting children have altruistic and educational motives, whereas worries about procedures may cause children to dissent. A great majority of school children and adolescents feel capable of understanding and giving assent or dissent to non-therapeutic research. (shrink)

Current COVID-19 pandemic and previous SARS/MERS outbreaks have caused a series of major crises to global public health. We must integrate the large and exponentially growing amount of heterogeneous coronavirus data to better understand coronaviruses and associated disease mechanisms, in the interest of developing effective and safe vaccines and drugs. Ontologies have emerged to play an important role in standard knowledge and data representation, integration, sharing, and analysis. We have initiated the development of the community-based Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO). (...) As an Open Biomedical Ontology (OBO) library ontology, CIDO is an open source and interoperable with other existing OBO ontologies. In this article, the general architecture and the design patterns of the CIDO are introduced, CIDO representation of coronaviruses, phenotypes, anti-coronavirus drugs and medical devices (e.g. ventilators) are illustrated, and an application of CIDO implemented to identify repurposable drug candidates for effective and safe COVID-19 treatment is presented. (shrink)

How are we to reconcile the existence of a good and omnipotent God with the existence of suffering? The simplest solution is to see all suffering as chastisement for sin. But this solution comes up against the difficulty that the good sometimes suffer and the impious sometimes prosper. ….